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The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread in a Limit-Order Market:  







This paper analyzes the components of the bid-ask spread in the limit-order book of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE). While the behavior of spread components in U.S. markets has been extensively studied, 
little is known about the spread components in a pure limit-order market. We find that both the adverse 
selection and order handling cost components of the TSE exhibit U-shape patterns independently, in 
contrast to the findings of Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) for U.S. stocks. On the TSE, 
there does not exist an upstairs market that allows large trades to be prenegotiated or certified as on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). This feature of the TSE provides a valuable opportunity to examine 
the relationship between trade size and spread components. Our results show that the adverse selection 
cost increases with trade size while order handling cost decreases with it.        
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Over the past years, limit-order trading has received growing attention as more exchanges implement 
electronic public limit-order books and open up the market-making process.  A number of studies have 
examined various aspects of the limit-order market.  In particular, Glosten (1994), Handa and Schwartz 
(1996), Rock (1996), Seppi (1997), Viswanathan and Wang (1998), and Foucault (1999) offer a variety of 
equilibrium models on limit-order trading.1  Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) offer an empirical analysis of 
the supply and demand of liquidity and interaction between the order book and order flow in the Paris 
Bourse.  Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) investigate the relative importance of market and limit orders. Ahn, 
Bae, and Chan (2001) analyze the interaction between transitory volatility and order flow composition in 
a limit-order market.  Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (1999) and Kavajecz (1999) examine whether 
quoted spreads reflect the trading interest of specialists or limit-order traders.2    
The purpose of this paper is to examine the components of the bid-ask spread in a limit-order market.  
Existing market microstructure theories on the components of the bid-ask spread are largely developed 
within the framework of quote-driven single (multiple) dealer markets.  In addition to the order-
processing costs, the bid-ask spread must cover the following two components: the inventory and 
information costs in a dealer market.3  However, the bid-ask spread is not unique to the dealer markets.  
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981) establish the existence of the bid-ask spread in a limit-
order market when investors face transaction costs of assessing information, monitoring market, and 
conveying orders to the market.  Glosten (1994) shows that the limit-order market will have a positive 
                                                           
1 See Seppi (1997) for a more detailed summary of other equilibrium models of limit-order market. 
 
2 Other empirical studies of limit-order market include Frino and McCorry (1995) and Hollifield, Miller, and Sandås 
(1999). 
 
3 Demsetz (1968) and Tinic (1972) identify the order-processing costs incurred by the providers of market liquidity. 
Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1983), and Amihud and Mendelson (1980), emphasize the inventory holding costs.  
Copeland and Galai (1983), Easley and O’Hara (1987), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) concentrate on the 






bid-ask spread arising from the possibility of trading on private information.  Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence on the bid-ask component in a limit-order market has been extremely limited.4                                
We examine the bid-ask component in a limit-order book of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).  On 
the TSE, there are no designated market makers with an obligation to take positions in the market.  Every 
transaction is executed by a saitori who maintains each offer to buy or sell in an order book, which is 
open to all exchange members on the floor.  All liquidity is supplied by traders who submit limit or 
market orders.  In this sense, the TSE may be better described as a market where a multiple number of 
dealers provide market-making at their own discretion (Takagi, 1993).  
A number of earlier papers explored various aspects of the TSE.  Amihud and Mendelson (1989, 
1991, and 1993) examine liquidity provision and price discovery on the TSE.  Hamao (1992) and Takagi 
(1993) present an overview of the institutional features of the TSE trading.  Lindsey and Schaede (1992) 
compare the role of a saitori with that of the specialist of the NYSE.  George and Hwang (1995) and Kim 
and Rhee (1997) investigate the effectiveness of the TSE price limit rules.  Two recent studies examine 
the intertemporal behavior of the market microstructure on the TSE.  Lehmann and Modest (1994) study 
the size of the bid-ask spread and its cross-sectional and intraday stability, among other issues.  They 
report U-shape intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads, return volatility, and trading volume.  Hamao and 
Hasbrouck (1995) investigate the properties of intraday trades and quotes on the TSE for a number of 
representative firms.  They find evidence consistent with asymmetric information effects within the limit-
order book.  
Our primary findings are as follows.  First, we found that both the adverse selection and order-
processing cost components exhibit U-shape patterns.  This contrasts with the finding by Madhavan, 
Richardson, and Roomans (1997) that on the NYSE the adverse selection component declines and order-
process component increases during the day.  The TSE evidence of an increase in adverse selection costs 
around the end of the trading day suggests that transactions around this period convey private information 
                                                           
4 Brockman and Chung (1999) and Chan (2000) study the bid-ask components on the Stock Exchange of Hong 






that would otherwise be released during the non-trading hours that follow the exchange close.  Second, 
we also find that adverse selection costs increase with trade size while order-processing costs decrease 
with it.  This result is compared with the evidence on the NYSE that medium trades contain more 
information than large trades, as reported by Barclay and Warner (1994) and Huang and Stoll (1997).  We 
believe that this difference in the relation between trade size and information content of a trade between 
the two exchanges comes from how the two exchanges treat large order flows.  On the NYSE, large block 
orders are sent to the upstairs, where transactions are made through a search-brokerage mechanism.  On 
the TSE, there is no separate venue for block trading.  All trades, large or small, are consolidated into the 
central electronic order book, where investor identity is not revealed as in upstairs trading on the NYSE.  
Our evidence that large trades convey more information provides strong support for the theoretical 
prediction given by Easley and O’Hara (1987) that informed investors prefer to trade large volume.  The 
majority of the world’s stock markets take the form of the limit order system.  Most of the extant studies, 
however, focus on quote driven markets or a hybrid system that adopts both limit order book and dealer 
system.  Our study implies that the process of how information is incorporated into stock price through 
trading on a limit order market is different from the existing evidence reported based on the quote driven 
or hybrid system.             
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.   Section 2 describes the tick-by-tick transaction 
data, the process of filtering the data, and summary statistics.  Section 3 presents a simple characterization 
of the bid-ask component model and estimation procedure.  Section 4 presents the empirical results for 
the cross-sectional difference and the intraday pattern of the bid-ask components.  The relation between 
trade size and bid-ask components is also examined.  Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
2.  Data sources, filtering, and summary statistics 
2.1 Data sources 
We obtain the real-time TSE trades and quotes data from Nikkei Economic Electronic Database 






the information on all quotes and trades in both price and quantity.5  It also has detailed flags indicating 
the conditions of each trade and quote.  These flags include the opening/closing trade indicators, buy/sell 
indictors, and special and warning quote indictors, among others.6  The NEEDS database essentially 
reflects all the trade and quote information broadcast to TSE members by the TSE. The database is the 
most detailed and extensive among the known data sets on the Japanese stock market. 
Our initial data set includes all transactions and quotes recorded for the 225 stocks that constitute the 
Nikkei Price Average Index.  The Nikkei 225 component stocks, selected from the first section of the 
TSE, are highly liquid and widely known as a good representation of the Japanese stock market.  The 
sample period is from January 5, 2000 to March 31, 2000, for a total of 60 trading days.  The first trading 
day of the year, January 4, 2000, is excluded since trading was conducted only during the morning 
session of the day.  
 
2.2 Data filtering process 
2.2.1 Tick size 
We use only the transactions and quotes on the TSE in our analysis.7  On the TSE, the tick size is a 
step function of stock prices.  For example, during the sample period used in this study, stocks priced less 
than or equal to ¥2,000 have a tick size of ¥ 1; stocks priced between ¥2,001 and ¥3,000 have a tick size 
of ¥5; and stocks priced between ¥3,001 and ¥30,000 have a tick size of ¥10.  While some stocks are 
priced above ¥30,000 and traded on greater tick sizes, most stocks trade at prices below ¥30,000.  In our 
initial sample of Nikkei 225 constituent stocks, six are priced above ¥30,000 and therefore excluded from 
the sample.  Exclusion of these six firms is to avoid possible confounding effects on the spread due to 
significantly larger tick sizes.  We then partition the remaining 219 firms into three groups based on 
individual tick sizes (i.e. ¥1, ¥5, and ¥10).  
                                                           
5 Even if time-stamped to the minute, the data are recorded to preserve the sequence of events within each minute.    
6 On August 24, 1998, the TSE officially abolished warning quotes.  However, the TSE order matching system is not 








2.2.2 Classification of buy and sell transactions 
To ensure a clean data set, we apply several filters to individual transactions and quotes for each stock 
in the sample.  Each transaction during the morning and afternoon sessions is classified as a buyer or a 
seller-initiated trade by the price location flags available from the dataset.  These flags indicate the 
location of each trade at the bid, ask, between the bid and ask, or outside the bid-ask range.  Almost all of 
the trades for our sample firms are made either at the bid or ask.  However, there is a small number of 
trades that are made either within or outside the spread. For an average firm in our sample, of the total 
19,682 transactions made during the regular sessions for the entire three-month period, 0.12 percent (24 
trades) are made within the spread while less than 0.01 percent (2 trades) are made outside the spread. 
Since the TSE is a pure order-driven market without responsible market makers, under normal conditions 
of a double auction, a trade should always hit either the bid or ask.  Therefore, we exclude all trades made 
within or outside the spread.       
 
2.2.3 Opening and closing transactions in the morning and afternoon sessions 
The trading day on the TSE is divided into morning (9:00-11:00 a.m. local time) and afternoon 
(12:30-3:00 p.m.) sessions.  All observations recorded before 9:00 a.m. or after 3:00 p.m. are excluded 
from the sample.  Therefore, we do not include transactions made during the off-hours trading session, 
which often deals with negotiated large block trades through a system called ToSTNet (Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Trading Network System).8  To examine the intraday patterns, we divide each trading day into 
nine 30-minute intervals, four in the morning session and five in the afternoon session. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 There are five regional exchanges in Japan: Osaka, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, and Sapporo Stock Exchanges.  
Some of the Nikkei constituent stocks also trade in regional exchanges.  However, regional exchanges are 
dominated by the TSE in terms trading volume.  Trade-throughs are not allowed. 
8 According to Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book (2000), off-hour trading was introduced for block orders on 
November 14, 1997.  ToSTNet-1 was established on June 29, 1998 to deal with off-hours trading for single issue 
orders and basket cross orders.  TosTNet-2 was established on August 7, 1998 to allow orders be executed at the 






On the TSE, the opening and closing transactions in each session are made under a batch clearing 
process called itayose while the rest of the trades during the day are made under a continuous double 
auction called zaraba.  Since the model for our empirical test applies to normal trading conditions under a 
continuous double auction, we only need transactions made under zaraba.  Thus, we exclude all itayose 
trades.  With the opening and closing trade and quote indicators, the data set enables us to accurately 
identify all trades made at itayose.  
 
 
2.2.4 Price limit on the TSE 
One important feature of the TSE is the price limit rule.  The TSE uses price limits to trigger 
indicative quote dissemination, to halt trade temporarily, and to allow continued price discovery through 
quote adjustment in some circumstances.9  For a stock trading between ¥1,001 and ¥1,500, the tick size is 
¥1, the maximum price variation between trades without trade being halted is ¥20, and the daily price 
limit is ¥200.  The daily price limits are quite large, ranging from 10 to 30 percent for most stocks priced 
below ¥30,000. Consequently, these limits are rarely hit.  For 156 of our 219 sample stocks, the price 
never hits the daily price limit during the entire three-month sample period. In contrast, the maximum 
price variation allowed between trades is on the order of 0.5 to 1.5 percent of the stock price, and thus the 
limit is hit more frequently.  For example, for 96 out of the 219 sample firms, the stock price reaches the 
intraday price limit during the sample period.  However, the average number of hits per day is low at 0.62 
times (0.19 percent of the total number of transactions on an average day).  
It is possible that these price-limit rules affect our estimation process based on order arrival sequences.  
For example, the price limits can hinder the natural price discovery process by suppressing part of the 
orders that are informative and, thus, would reduce the amount of information asymmetry that would 
otherwise be present in the market.  This is especially true for the case of daily price limits since trading is 
allowed only within the daily limit during the entire day.  Therefore, our estimates of spread components 
                                                           
9 It is a debatable issue whether these rules help price continuity.  See Kim and Rhee (1997) for an empirical study 






could be smaller than the amount of the information asymmetry that would appear in the absence of the 
price limits.10  
 
2.2.5 Special quotes  
The TSE requires the saitori to post a special quote when a major order imbalance between buy and 
sell orders arises.  Once posted, the special quote remains until a counter order arrives and a new 
equilibrium is established, at which point the quote is withdrawn.  In the absence of the arrival of any 
counter order, the quote can be renewed at an interval of every five minutes within the variation limit set 
forth by the exchange.  The display mechanism of a special quote has several distinct features.  A special 
quote is always accompanied by a null quote (zero price and zero quantity) on the other side.  The 
quantity displayed with a special quote is the net buying and selling order quantities rather than the 
quantity available at the quote.  In addition, the price location flag for the trade following a special quote 
does not indicate the usual ‘transaction at ask’ or ‘transaction at bid’ but the arrival and execution of a 
buy order or a sell order.  Since a trade or trades matched with special quotes cannot be seen as part of a 
successive normal order flow, we exclude any trades following special quotes during the regular trading 
hours.11    
 
2.2.6 Partial execution of large market orders 
 
Sometimes an incoming market order is too large to be absorbed by the current bid or ask quotes.  In 
this case, the saitori partially fills the order up to the size of the current quote.  Then the remaining 
portion is converted into a limit order at the current quote.12  For example, suppose the current ask is ¥500 
for 1,000 shares. If a market buy order of 1,200 shares arrives, it can only be partially executed against 
the current ask up to 1,000 shares.  The remaining 200 shares will be converted into a limit buy order (an 
                                                           
10 As an alternative approach we apply a filter that excludes the entire 30-minute interval if a trade hits either the 
daily or intraday price limits.  However, our results are not sensitive to this filtering method. 
11 Issuances of special quotes could be related with severe information asymmetry in the market. In a separate 
analysis, we include the transactions executed against special quotes. However, the estimation results are virtually 






ask quote of 200 shares at ¥500).  Two outcomes can follow: (1) an incoming market sell order or limit 
sell order priced at ¥500 or below hits this ask quote or, (2) when there is no immediate arrival of either 
type of orders, the 200 share buy order walks up the book and hits the limit sell order at the next best 
price.13   
Particular attention on buy-sell classification is required when a trade is executed under the first 
situation (i.e. an incoming order hits the limit order originated from partial execution of a market order).  
The trade, in the above example, is classified as a sell transaction in the original dataset.  However, since 
this 200 share trade originates from the market buy order of 1,200 shares, it is more reasonable to treat it 
as a buy transaction instead of a sell transaction.  A large market order (and often a series of large market 
orders on the same side) indicates the arrival of new information about the security.  A series of 
transactions initiated on the same side will be more consistent with the information arrival.  Therefore, we 
reclassified all trades that result from partial execution of large market orders.  We also repeat all 
following analyses using the original buy-sell classification provided by the data set.  Our reclassification 
rule, however, generally results in better, if marginal, convergence in the estimation of spread 
components. We report the results based on the reclassification. 14   
 
 
2.2.7 Final sample 
It also happens that the tick size of some stocks changes in our sample.  In this case, we exclude the 
half-hour section if the tick size changes (for example, from ¥1 to ¥5 or vice versa) during the interval.  
To ensure enough observations within each half-hour interval, we impose the condition that there are at 
least five valid transactions during the interval.  Then, we drop the entire trading day if it has fewer than 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 The saitori used to display a warning quote briefly to invite liquidity in this situation before the TSE’s rule change 
on warning quotes in 1998.  Since the rule change, the quote is treated as part of general quotes. 
13 The saitori uses discretion on the exposure duration of the limit order converted from a partially executed market 
order. 
14 The way to obtain immediacy of a large order in the TSE’s institutional setting might be not to submit a market 
order but to submit an opposing limit order with a price that guarantees an immediate and full trade execution. 
Indeed, a limit sell (buy) order submitted in this fashion should be regarded as a market buy (sell) order in disguise 






nine half-hour intervals.  Finally, we make sure that, for every stock, there are more than 30 valid trading 
days available.  Otherwise, we drop the stock.  This final filtering process excludes 15 firms, leaving 204 
firms in our final sample.  These 204 stocks include 171 stocks within the price range of less than ¥2,000, 
11 within the price range of ¥2,000 to ¥2,999, and 22 within the range of ¥3,000 to ¥29,999.  For easy 
exposition, we call them group 1 (under ¥2,000), group 2 (¥2,000 to ¥2,999), and group 3  (¥3,000 to 
¥29,999) stocks. 
 
2.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics including the cross-sectional mean, median, and standard 
deviation for a number of market variables.  For group 1 stocks, the median transaction price is ¥471.  
Trading is very active with the median number of transactions being 249 per day.  The median trade size 
is 4,630 shares.  The median spreads are ¥1.85 and 0.45 percent of the bid-ask midpoint.  For group 2 
stocks, the median transaction price is ¥2,460.  Group 2 stocks are even more actively traded with the 
median number of daily transactions being 361.  The median trade size is 3,530 shares.  The median 
spreads are ¥7.77 and 0.31 percent of the bid-ask midpoint.  For group 3 stocks, the median price is much 
larger at ¥5,861.  The median number of daily trades is 333.  Trade size measured by number of shares is 
smaller, with a median of 2,200 shares; trade size measured in yen is much larger.  The median spreads 
are ¥21.05 and 0.33 percent of the bid-ask midpoint.  Finally, the market capitalization is much larger for 
group 2 stocks than for group 1 stocks.  The median market capitalization of group 2 stocks is almost 
seven times that of group 1 stocks.  The median market capitalization is the largest for group 3 stocks, 
more than nine times that of group 1 stocks. 
Table 2 provides the cross-sectional mean estimates of the market variables for the nine half-hour 
intraday intervals during the morning and afternoon sessions on the TSE.  For all three groups of stocks, 
intraday volatility, number of transactions, yen volume, and yen trade size in general exhibit the familiar 
U-shape over the course of the trading day.  The increase in volatility, number of trades, trading volume, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           






and trade size is more pronounced towards the end of the trading day than in the opening half-hour.  
There is evidence that the lunch break also induces higher volatility, more transactions, higher trading 
volume, and larger trade size, but at a smaller magnitude compared to the opening and closing half-hours.             
Table 3 summarizes the intraday patterns of bid-ask spread for stocks sorted by the three price 
categories.  For group 1 stocks in Panel A for example, the spread averages ¥2.89 in the opening half-
hour, drops to ¥2.12 in the middle of the day, then rises to ¥2.41 towards the closing half-hour.  This is 
equivalent to 0.66, 0.54, and 0.60 percent of the bid-ask midpoint.  The spread in yen terms is much larger 
for high-priced stocks in Panels B and C.  The corresponding spread in percentage terms is lower, but the 
intraday patterns are similar.  The standard errors also suggest that the mean estimates are reliable, despite 
the small sample size for medium- and high-priced stocks.  There is also some evidence of a slight 
increase in the spread around the lunch break, indicating that both morning and afternoon sessions have 
their own U-shape pattern. The spreads during the last half hour in the morning session and the first half 
hour of the afternoon session are slightly greater than the spreads in the neighboring half hour intervals. 
The intraday pattern of the spread reported in Table 3 is consistent with those reported by Lehmann and 
Modest (1994) and Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995). 
 
3.  Estimating the components of the bid-ask spread 
3.1 The model 
 
Theoretical and empirical work on the components of bid-ask spread is extensive.  In general, there 
are two classes of statistical models.  The first one relies on the serial covariance properties of the 
observed transaction prices (see Roll (1984), Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1984), George, Kaul, and 
Nimalendran (1991), Stoll (1989), Lin (1992), Huang and Stoll (1994), Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995)).  
The second class of models is based on the trade initiation indicator variable.  The work by Glosten and 
Harris (1988) and Madhavan and Smidt (1991) fall into this category.15  More recently, Huang and Stoll 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
flow information and allow us of such reclassification.  
15 Other related works include Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b, 1993) and Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995), who apply a 






(1997) develop a general indicator model within which the various existing models may be reconciled.  
This model allows a three-way decomposition of the adverse selection, inventory-carrying, and order-
processing components.  At the same time, Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) extend the 
indicator model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) to allow the order flow to be correlated.   
The trade indicator models are appropriate for our purpose to investigate the intraday variations in 
spread components since they can be easily used to estimate different components for different times of 
the trading day by introducing time indicator variables. In particular, the framework developed by 
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) or MRR model can be readily applied to the study of bid-
ask components in an order driven market such as the TSE.  Although they do not explicitly model the 
limit-order book, a limit-order trader can be interpreted as another market maker.16  In Huang and Stoll’s 
model, the inventory cost component of the spread has an important role and is estimated separately. 
However, the inventory component is ignored in the model developed by Mahavan, Richardson, and 
Roomans. Instead, the model decomposes the spread into the permanent component due to information 
(adverse selection) and the transitory component.  This approach has an attractive feature since it is 
believed that inventory costs are of a less important concern for limit order traders, unlike the case of the 
NYSE specialist who is obliged at all times to maintain inventory positions on both sides of the market.  
We use the general framework of the MRR model for our analysis of spread decomposition.  However, 
estimation results might be sensitive to the specifications used by different market microstructure models. 
Hence, we use other models such as de Jong, Nijman, Roell (1997) model, the Glosten and Harris model 
(1988), and the Hasbrouck’s VAR model (1988, 1991a, b) to cross-validate our estimation results.  These 
alternative models are discussed later in Section 4.4.                   
Now we briefly describe the MRR model for estimating the components of bid-ask spread on the TSE.  
We denote the price of transaction at time t as Pt., and define Qt to be the buy-sell trade indicator variable 
for the transaction price.  Qt = +1 if the transaction is buyer initiated and –1 if the trade is seller initiated.  







                                           t1tt1-ttt u)Q-Q()QQ(P ++−=∆ −βρα .                                                     (1) 
The first term captures the effect of revision in belief, where α ≥ 0 measures the possible asymmetric 
information revealed by the trade at time t.  The second term captures the effect of bid-ask bounce, where 
β ≥ 0 denotes the liquidity suppliers’ cost per share for supplying liquidity.  Equation (1) extends the 
approach in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and allows for the autocorrelation in order flows.  Let π denote 
the probability of a trade continuation on the same side of the bid or ask.  Then, the conditional 
expectation of a trader indicator at t given Qt-1 is E(Qt|Qt-1) = (1-2π)Qt-1 ≡ ρQt-1, where ρ is the first-order 
autocorrelation of the trade initiation variable.  In the absence of adverse selection (α = 0) and inventory 
and ordering processing costs (β = 0), the model reduces to the classical case where prices follow a 
random walk.  When the autocorrelation of trade indicators variable is zero (ρ = 0), the model reduces to 
the setting in Glosten and Milgrom (1985). 
 
3.2 Estimation procedure 
The three parameters (α, β, ρ) governing the behavior of transaction prices and quotes in Equation (1) 
can be estimated using generalized method of moments (GMM), which imposes very weak distribution 
assumptions.  This is especially important because the error term includes rounding errors due to 
discreteness of stock prices.  The GMM procedure also easily accounts for the presence of conditional 
heteroskedasticity of an unknown form.17  Specifically, the expectation of the following four population 
moments is zero :  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 Greene (1996) extends the model in this direction. 
17 We can think of an OLS regression as an alternative to the GMM procedure for parameter estimation. However, 
the OLS cannot identify each parameter when there is a correlation term, ρ, as in (1). There are three parameters, α, 














































,                (2) 
where ut is as defined in (1), or )-Q(Q)QQ(P∆ 1tt1t-tt −−−− βρα  and u0 is a constant drift.  The first 
equation is the definition of the autocorrelation in the trade initiation variable.  The second equation 
defines the constant term u0 as the average pricing error.  The last three equations are the normalizing 
equations.  The instrumental variables are the lagged trade initiation variable Qt-1 plus a constant.  It is 
worth noting that since all of the transactions included in the final sample occur on either side of the bid 
and ask quotes, the probability of a transaction occurring within the bid ask quotes is zero.  Therefore, we 
do not need to estimate that probability as in Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997).           
 
4.  Parameter estimates                                       
4.1 Cross-sectional patterns 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics on the individual parameter estimates for three groups of 
stocks.  The summary statistics include the mean coefficient estimate, mean standard error, standard 
deviation of the estimates, and median estimates for adverse selection cost (α), order-processing cost (β), 
autocorrelation of order flow (ρ), the implied spread, 2(α + β), and the proportion of the adverse selection 
component in the implied spread (γ=α/(α+β)).18  The adverse selection cost, order-processing cost, and 
the implied spread in percentage terms is calculated relative to the average prices over the sample period.  
The drift term µ0 is essentially zero and therefore not reported.  
 
4.1.1 Adverse selection (α) and order-processing (β) components 
                                                           
18 The stock price is given by ttt1tt1tt Q)Q(QVP ηεβρα +++−+= −− , replace Qt by +1 and –1 to obtain the bid-






The mean values of adverse selection component α are ¥0.460, ¥1.416, and ¥6.268 for three groups 
of stocks.  In percentage terms, the adverse selection components are 0.091, 0.057, and 0.071 percent 
respectively.  The lowest-priced group has the largest percentage adverse selection component, which is 
significantly different from median- and highest-priced stocks based on the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed rank test.  The results are consistent with the evidence from the market capitalization in Table 1.  
The lowest-priced stocks have a significantly smaller market value than higher-priced stocks.  Therefore, 
the lowest-priced stocks tend to be less widely followed in the market and are subject to a greater degree 
of asymmetric information.  Table 2 also provides the standard errors for the estimates.  In all cases, the 
standard errors are small.19  
The median values of order-processing cost β are ¥0.395, ¥1.657, and ¥4.001, respectively for the 
three groups of stocks.  These translate into 0.141, 0.067, and 0.052 percent of the bid-ask midpoint.  The 
order-processing component is significantly lower for the highest-priced stocks, as indicated by the p-
values from the Wilcoxon signed rank tests.  For the lowest- and median-priced stocks, order-processing 
costs are similar in percentage terms.       
 
4.1.2 Auto-correlation of order flow (ρ) 
The autocorrelation of order flow ρ are 0.315, 0.235, and 0.284, respectively for three groups of 
stocks.  The differences are highly significant between either pair of groups.  Since by definition, (1-2π) ≡ 
ρ, we can infer from the estimates of ρ = 0.315 that 1- π = 0.658, which is the probability of a transaction 
continuing on the same side of the bid (ask) for the lowest-price stocks.  Similarly, the probability of 
continuation is 1 - π = 0.618 for median-priced stocks, and 1 - π = 0.642 for highest-priced stocks.  A 
positive autocorrelation in order arrivals has been found for U.S. stocks by Hasbrouck and Ho (1987), 
Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988), Hasbrouck (1991a), and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995).  For limit-
                                                           
 
19 The estimates are obtained from a sample including the half-hour session when the price limit is violated.  We 
also estimate the model with a sample excluding the half-hour session when the price limit is violated.  The results 






order markets such as the Paris Bourse and TSE, the order flow is also found to be positively correlated 
(Biais, Hillion, and Spatt, 1995; Hamao and Hasbrouck, 1995).  Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) offer 
several hypotheses for the positive autocorrelation of order flow including strategic order splitting, traders 
imitating or piggy-backing each other, and traders reacting similarly, but successively, to the same events.   
 
4.1.3 The implied spread and the proportion of adverse selection in spread 
The implied spread at time t is a random variable with mean 2(α + β).  The median implied spreads 
are ¥1.45, ¥6.26, and ¥15.81 respectively.  The median quoted spreads from Table 1 are ¥1.85, ¥7.77, and 
¥21.05.  In percentage terms, the implied spreads are 0.33, 0.25, and 0.25 percent respectively.  The 
sample spreads are 0.45, 0.31, and 0.33 percent.  The estimated spread is lower than the sample mean 
spread by a factor of 20-30 percent for the group 1 stocks that account for a majority of the sample.  The 
discrepancy is slightly smaller in magnitude to Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) for a sample 
of U.S. stocks.  For U.S. stocks, the discrepancy can be readily attributed to transactions occurring 
between the quotes, which happen much more often than for Japanese stocks.20  There are two pontential 
explanations for underestimation on the TSE.  The sample spread in Table 1 is the average of all quoted 
spreads.  The implied spread, on the other hand, is based on the effective spread, i.e. conditioned on 
actual trades.  When the quoted spread is large, it is less likely that the quotes are hit.  Therefore, even 
after eliminating all trades that occur inside the spreads on the TSE, the implied spread remains smaller 
than the average quoted spread.  Alternatively, trades may take place at the side of the market offering the 
highest liquidity.  Suppose liquidity is plentiful on one side of the market while it is not on the other side. 
The asymmetry in liquidity supply in this situation can cause an asymmetry in the spread: the spread on 
the side with plentiful liquidity can be smaller than the spread on the other side.  In other words, the 
spread of the side with greater liquidity is less than one half of the quoted spread.  Trades are likely to hit 
                                                           
20 According to NYSE reported statistics, about 30 percent of NYSE transactions occur at the midpoint, but in 






the side with plentiful liquidity more often.  As our implied spread measure reflects the half spread of the 
side where transactions take place, it can be smaller than the quoted spread.21     
If we define γ as the ratio of the adverse selection component of the spread (2α) to the total implied 
spread, the estimate of γ has a mean of α/(α + β).  The estimates are 0.498, 0.448, and 0.571 respectively.  
The adverse selection component accounts for a bigger portion of the implied spread for the highest-
priced stocks.  We also perform a non-parametric test to examine the significance of the differences 
between the three groups.  The difference is particularly significant between the highest-priced stocks and 
the lowest-priced stocks. 
  
4.2  Intraday patterns 
Perhaps the best known stylized fact about the intraday patterns in bid-ask spread (and volume, and 
volatility) is that there is a broad U-shaped pattern in virtually all equity markets, whether they are quote-
driven or order-driven.22  Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (1999) recently report that the U-shape pattern 
of spreads on 144 stocks on the NYSE largely reflects the intraday variation in spreads established by 
limit-order traders.  The intraday variation in dealers’ spreads is different; the spreads are widest at the 
open, narrow until late morning, and then level off.  Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) 
decompose the adverse selection and order-process parts of the spread for a sample of 274 of NYSE 
stocks.  Their major finding is that the adverse selection component declines steadily throughout the day, 
while the dealer cost component increases over the course of the day, resulting in the U-shape pattern of 
the implied spread.  Their work on NYSE stocks can be refined by classifying the quotes and transactions 
according to whether they originate from the dealers or limit-order traders.  On the TSE, all the orders are 
supplied through the limit-order book.  In this regard, the evidence from TSE will increase our 
understanding of the forces behind the observed U-shaped pattern. 
                                                           
21 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the explanation. 






Table 5 presents the intraday pattern for the estimates.  For all three groups of stocks, the adverse 
selection component, both in yen and percentage terms, exhibit a clear U-shape by itself.23  The mean 
value of α is highest at the opening and closing half-hours, and lowest in the middle of the day.  The U-
shape pattern is also pronounced for the order-processing component.  The mean standard errors in 
parentheses indicate that the estimates are reliable across each intraday interval.  The U-shape patterns in 
both components necessarily imply a U-shape in the implied spread.  Moreover, the proportion of adverse 
selection cost to the implied spread also displays a broad U-shape over the course of a trading day.  The 
last column reports the F-statistics for testing the hypotheses that the variables are equal across eleven 
intraday intervals.  The results strongly reject the null hypotheses.   
Our analysis is based on the stock groups formed by different tick sizes.  However, the spread may be 
a function of other characteristics that are closely related with the liquidity of the stock, such as trading 
volume or return volatility.  To check the robustness of our finding, we regroup the sample firms into 
three subgroups based on daily trading volume.  Table 6 reports the estimated results of the spread 
components for different half-hour intervals of the trading day.  The results are qualitatively identical to 
those found from the samples based on tick size.  All three subgroups based on trading volume exhibit 
strong U-shape patterns in the adverse selection component, the order processing component, the implied 
spread, and the adverse selection portion of the implied spread.24  
Since α represents the magnitude of the revision in limit-order traders’ beliefs concerning the 
fundamental value of the stock induced by the order flow, a large α in the opening half-hour is consistent 
with the degree of asymmetric information being highest when information is accumulated overnight.  
The gradual decline of α is consistent with the market learning about the fundamental asset value through 
trading (Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans, 1997).  But learning or price discovery cannot explain 
why α rises again towards the end of the trading day.  The pattern of a rise in α towards the close clearly 
                                                           
23 There is also a pattern of a small increase in the adverse selection around the lunch break. The differences, though, 
are statistically indistinguishable when the estimates during the intervals of half hour before and after the lunch 






suggests that information contents of trading increases in the last 30-minute session of trading, and that 
limit-order traders reflect this increase in informed trading in their revision of beliefs.  
The striking pattern of a rise in the adverse selection cost toward the end of the trading day can be 
explained in the framework of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), who predict covariations of trading volume, 
the variance of price changes, and adverse selection costs.  In the equilibrium of the Admati and 
Pfleiderer model, trading by discretionary liquidity traders is relatively more concentrated in periods 
closer to the realization of their demands.  This concentration of liquidity trading in turn attracts privately 
informed traders, who camouflage their informed trades among liquidity trades.  Therefore, prices are 
more informed in these periods.  The last 30-minute trading session is characterized by the fact that it falls 
just before the exchange is closed, after which it is difficult to trade.  Therefore, discretionary liquidity 
traders will concentrate their trading around this period.  Also, the settlement rules will cause a further 
concentration of trading around this time.  The increase in trading around the end of the trading day is 
well supported by the intraday trading pattern on the TSE. In fact, the daily number of transactions is 
highest during the closing 30 minutes for all three groups of stocks (Table 2).  As liquidity trading 
increases at the end of the trading day, so does informed trading.  Besides, informed traders have added 
motivations to trade before the market close than wait until the next market opening.  First, the value of 
the private information these investors have will decline during the overnight non-trading period. Further, 
the overnight non-trading period adds uncertainty that the price moves unfavorably to the informed 
traders.  As a result, the end of the trading day will better reflect the private information that would 
otherwise be released during the non-trading hours that follow the exchange close.25  
We further investigate whether the significant increase in the adverse selection cost during the last 
half hour of the day is mainly due to the final minutes of trading right before the exchange close.  We 
divide the final half hour period of the day into six five-minute intervals and estimate the spread 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 We also partition the sample into three groups based on return volatility and find the similar U-shape patterns. The 
results are available upon request. 
25 It will be interesting to see if the introduction of off-hour trading for large block trades through the ToSTNet 






components.  The results are reported in Table 7.  The adverse selection component displays a dramatic 
increase in the final five-minutes.  For example, the average α of Group 1 stocks is 0.107 percent from 
ten minutes to five minutes before the close.  Then, it escalates to 0.165 percent in the final five minutes. 
Even though not as dramatic as for Group 1, a similar pattern is found for both Group 2 and 3 stocks. The 
evidence suggests that the adverse selection component shifts up just before the close.  The order 
handling component also exhibits a similar pattern but its pattern of increase is rather gradual.   
 
4.3 Trade size  
 Recent research has begun to examine the relation of trade size and various components of bid-ask 
spread.  Trade size introduces an adverse selection problem because, given that they wish to trade, 
informed investors prefer to trade large amounts at any given price (Easley and O’Hara, 1987).  This 
implies that large trades tend to convey more information than small trades.  Empirically, Lin, Sanger, 
and Booth (1995) show that the adverse selection component increases with trade size and the order-
processing cost decreases with trade size for a sample of 150 U.S. firms in 1988.  However, using a 
sample of 20 component stocks in the Major Market Index in 1992, Huang and Stoll (1997) report 
conflicting evidence that the adverse selection component is smaller for sequences of two trades that end 
in a large trade than for sequences that end in a medium or small trade.  Huang and Stoll (1997) argue that 
the results could be due to the upstairs trading of large block trades.26  Since there is no upstairs trading 
for block trades on the TSE, all trades have to go through the trading system.  The data from TSE offers 
an opportunity to look further into the issue.          
 We generalize Equation (1) to allow different coefficient estimates by trade size category.  We choose 
three trade size categories, although any number of categories is possible.  Consider the following 
specification:     
   
                                                           
26  In upstairs markets, large transactions are accomplished through a search-brokerage mechanism where an 
intermediary or broker locates counterparts to a trade before sending it to the downstairs market for execution.  
Keim and Madhavan (1996) provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the upstairs market.  See also Madhavan 















iβρα                                         (3) 
 
where i, j = small, medium, large, referring to the trade size categories at time t-2 and t-1. ijα , ijβ , and 
ijρ  are the adverse selection component, order-processing component, and order-flow correlation when  
trade size moves from i category at time t-2 to j category at time t-1.  The model in Equation (3) is fairly 
complex for it requires nine different values of α, β, and ρ for each of the nine trade-size transitions 
between t-2 and t-1.  Therefore, we use data points to classify each possible transition.   
 In Japan, trading takes place in units of a specified number of shares, or minimum trading unit (MTU).  
The common unit is 1,000 shares.27  For the 204 stocks in our final sample, the majority (196) have a 
trading unit of 1,000 shares.  Only eight firms have a trading unit of 100 shares.  We define a trade to be 
small if the number of shares traded is equal to the MTU.  A medium-size transaction trades between the 
MTU and 10 times the MTU.  A large-size transaction trades at more than 10 times the MTU.  Using the 
196 firms with a MTU of 1,000 shares as an example, a small-size trade involves 1,000 shares.  A 
medium-size trade involves between 1,001 and 9,999 shares.  A large-size trade involves at least 10,000 
shares.  We calculate the distribution of all transactions over the three-month period for each firm in our 
sample.  The cross-sectional average distribution is 40, 45, and 14 percent for small, medium, and large 
trades.28    
Table 8 summarizes the empirical results.29  The column categories refer to the transaction size in 
time t-1 and the row categories refer to the transaction size in t-2.  Looking across the columns, the 
estimates of α are larger for sequences of two trades that end in a large trade than for sequences of two 
                                                           
27 For stocks listed on the TSE, the Exchange recommends units of 1,000, 500, 100, 50, or 10 shares.  There are 
some cases when trading units are 2,000 shares or 1 share. 
28 The cross-sectional averages of the correlations between different-size trades, normalized for daily number of 
trades, are 0.10 between small and medium trades, -0.04 between small and large trades, and 0.12 between the 
medium and large trades. 
29 The cross-sectional average of observations in the GMM estimation is 3,105 and 1,116, respectively, for small-to-
small and large-to-large trade sequences.  Trade sequences that begin or end with small or medium transactions 
typically have more observations than sequences that begin or end with  large transactions.  We require both α and β 






trades that end in a medium or small trade.  There is in fact a monotonic increase in the adverse selection 
component regardless of the initiating trade size at time t-2.  The corresponding F-value indicates that the 
difference is highly significant.  Looking down the rows in the first two columns, trade sequences 
initiated by a large trade at time t-2 always have a larger estimate of α than trade sequences initiated by a 
medium or small trade at time t-2.  The estimate for α is 0.059 for a small-to-small trade sequence versus 
0.127 for a large-to-large trade sequence.  These results strongly indicate that large trades on the TSE 
contain more information about the security price and are consistent with the way in which TSE handles 
large trades.30  
When we look across the columns in Panel B, the estimates of order-processing cost β are smaller for 
sequences of two trades that end in a large trade than for sequences that end in a medium or small trade.  
The difference is monotonic and highly significant for the first two rows.  The overall pattern is that 
order-processing cost decreases with trade size.  For example, the estimate for β is 0.158 for a small-to-
small trade sequence versus 0.105 for a large-to-large trade sequence.  But the decrease in the order-
processing cost is less dramatic than the increase in the adverse selection cost as trade size increases. Note 
that the negative relation between the order processing component and trade size has an implication on 
inventory costs on the TSE.  Our order processing component estimates include both inventory costs and 
usual order handling costs.  While order handling costs are expected to decrease with trade size due to 
economies of scale31, inventory costs are likely to increase with it.  The fact that our estimates that 
combine these two cost factors decrease with trade size implies the possibility that the effect of order 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
average number of stocks included is 203 and 157, respectively, for small-to-small and large-to-large trade 
sequences. 
30 We also test whether there is any significant difference in the magnitudes of the adverse selection as well as the 
order processing components between large-to-large trades at the same side of the market and large-to-large trades 
at the different side of the market. For stocks in Group 2 and Group 3, large-to-large trades on the same side of the 
market, a large buy followed by another large buy for an example, turn out to have significantly greater adverse 
selection (smaller order processing) costs than large-to-large trades at the different side of the market. Group 1 
stocks on the other hand do not display any distinct difference.  
31 For example, we can think of brokerage fees as part of order handling costs for limit order traders. The brokerage 






handling costs dominates the effect of inventory costs. This is consistent with the notion that inventory 
costs are of a less important concern to limit order traders on the TSE. 
 
4.4 Estimation by alternative models  
Spread component estimates are known to be sensitive to model specifications (de Jong, Nijman, and 
Roell (1996)). In this section, we apply alternative spread decomposition models and demonstrate that our 
findings are not simply driven by methodological differences. Specifically, we compare our results based 
on the Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) or MRR model of spread decomposition with those 
based on the De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) model and the Glosten and Harris (1988) model. Later, 
we introduce the VAR model developed by Hasbrouk (1988, 1991a, b) and examine whether different 
models produce comparable spread estimates.    
De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) extend the Glosten (1994) model and analyze the intraday price 
effects on the Paris Bourse.  The De Jong et al. (1996) model is specified as follows: 
 
t1-tt11-t0tt1t0t uQqeQe)Q∆(qR∆QR∆P +++++= µ ,                (4) 
  
where Pt is the transaction price at time t, Qt is the buy-sell trade indicator variable, qt is the size of trade 
measured or number of shares traded measured in multiples of Minimum Trading Unit (MTU).  In this 
model, the order-processing component is c0+c1qt, where c0 is R0-e0-e1⋅α, c1 is R1-0.5⋅e1, and α is the 
median of trade size divided by log(2).  The adverse selection component is given by (R0-c0)+(R1-c1)qt.   
Meanwhile, we can specify the Glosten and Harris (1988) model in the context of De Jong, Nijman, 
and Roell (1986) as follows: 
 







where Pt, Qt, and qt are defined as in Model (4).  In the above model, z0+z1qt is the post-trade expectation 
to the order flow, or the adverse selection cost component of the spread. c0+c1qt is the order handling cost 
component.  The two models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), where the standard errors 
have been adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) method.  In actual estimation, the trades size is 
censored so that transactions larger than 99.5 percentile of all trades are excluded.  This is to mitigate the 
effect of very large trades on the estimates (Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay, 1992). 
The estimation results by both models are presented in Table 9.  For ease of comparison we also 
report the spread component estimates form the MRR model in the same table.  Panel A reports the mean 
parameter estimates and mean standard errors (in parenthesis) from the alternative models.  Panel B 
compares the adverse selection component, the order-processing component, and the proportion of 
adverse selection component of the spread from the three models.  Since spread components depend on 
trade size, the spread components for each individual stock are first calculated when trade size qt is set 
equal to 1 MTU, median MTUs, 10 MTUs, and 99 percentile MTUs of all trades, respectively.  Then, the 
cross-sectional mean spread components are reported.   
As expected, the spread component estimation is sensitive to model specifications. The estimates of 
the adverse selection (order handling) component from the two alternative models are generally lower 
(greater) than our estimate from the MRR model. In the De Jong et at. (1996) model, the adverse selection 
component is (R0 –c0)+(R1-c1)qt.  Using Group 1 stocks as an example, when qt is set at the median trade 
size, the cross-sectional average of the adverse selection is 0.301.  In the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, 
the adverse selection cost component is z0+z1qt.  Again, for Group 1 with the median trade size, the 
average estimate of the adverse selection component is 0.280.  These two numbers are compared with our 
mean MRR estimate of the adverse selection component for the same group, 0.460.  The order handling 
component in the De Jong et at. (1996) framework is c0+c1qt.  For Group 1, the average order handling 
component estimate is 0.541 with qt set at the median trade size.  The order handling component in the 
Glosten and Harris model, also c0+c1qt, is 0.562.  The MRR counterpart of these numbers is 0.395.  The 






0.332 under the De Jong et al. model and 0.306 under the Glosten and Harris model, compared with 0.395 
for the MRR model.32  A similar pattern of discrepancies in the estimates by the alternative models can be 
found from Group 2 and Group 3.  
In the previous subsection, we demonstrated that the informativeness of trading increases with trade 
size on the TSE.  Panel B of Table 9 shows that the alternative models, despite the slight discrepancies in 
the estimates, confirm the same positive relation between the adverse selection component estimates and 
trade size.  The adverse selection component rises monotonically as trade size increases.  Based on the De 
Jong et at. (1996) model, using Group 1 stocks as an example, the cross-sectional average of the adverse 
selection is 0.295 when qt is set to 1 MTU.  When qt is set at the median trade size, the average adverse 
selection component is 0.301.  With qt set at 10 MTUs, it is 0.349.  For the Glosten and Harris (1988) 
model, the average estimate of the adverse selection component for the same stock group is 0.269 when qt 
is 1 MTU.  It then increases to 0.280 and to 0.375 as qt increases to the median trade size and to 10 MTUs.  
The proportion of the adverse selection component in the implied spread also confirms the pattern.  For 
both models, the proportion of the spread attributable to informed trading increases monotonically as the 
trade size increases.  The same pattern is observed from Group 2 and Group 3.   
The overall negative association of order-processing costs with trade size observed in Table 8 is not 
found in the estimated results by the De Jong et al. (1996) model.  However, the estimation results by the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) model indicates that order processing costs decrease monotonically as the trade 
size increases.  
The trade indicator models of Glosten and Harris (1988), de Jong et al. (1996), and MRR assume that 
the information content of a trade is immediately and fully revealed after each transaction.  No lagging 
price effect is assumed.  However, the results on Table 8 indicate that trades may have lagged information 
effects as well.  Further, the models assume that the trading pattern is exogenous.  However, if the trading 
pattern is endogenously determined and lagged trades have some effects on the current trades, the 
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coefficients of the regressions based on the above structural models might be biased.33  To address these 
problems, we apply the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model introduced by Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, b). 
In Hasbrouck’s model, prices and trade patterns are jointly modeled by a system of equations. 

























m         (6)  
where Pt is the transaction price at time t, Qt is the buy-sell trade indicator variable, qt is the size of trade 
measured or number of shares traded measured in multiples of Minimum Trading Unit (MTU).  The 
inclusion of A0 term allows the current price changes to depend on the current buy-sell indicator Qt and 
signed trade size qtQt.  We consider lagged price effects from transactions for up to five lags.  
Table 10 presents the estimation results based on the Hasbrouck’s VAR model.  Panel A reports the 
mean estimates and mean standard errors (in parenthesis) for a01 and a02 from the VAR model.  Panel B 
reports the estimated half-spread from the VAR model along with the estimated half-spreads based on the 
other alternative models.  In the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, the half-spread is given by (c0+z0)+ 
(c1+z1)qt.  In the De Jong et al. (1996) model, the half-spread is calculated as R0+R1qt.  In the Hasbrouck 
VAR model, the half-spread is computed as a01+a02qt.  The half-spread from the MRR model is calculated 
as α+β. Since half-spreads depend on trade size, half-spreads for each individual stock are first calculated 
by setting trade size qt to be equal to 1 MTU, median MTUs, 10 MTUs, and 99 percentile MTUs of all 
trades, respectively.  Then the cross-sectional means and mean standard errors (in parentheses) of half-
spreads are reported in Panel B.  The panel reveals that the Hasbrouk’s VAR model provides half spread 
estimates very close to those produced by the MRR and the other alternative models.  For example, in the 
                                                           






case of Group 1 stocks, when the trade size is a medium one, the average half spread by the Hasbrouk’s 
model is 0.833.  This figure is very close to 0.855 by the MRR model or 0.842 by the de Jong et al. and 




This paper examines the components of the bid-ask spread in the TSE limit-order book.  We analyze 
unique tick-by-tick data for Nikkei 225 constituent stocks over a three-month period from January to 
March 2000.  Our analysis reveals a number of findings that are different from those for other major 
exchanges such as the NYSE.  In particular, both the adverse selection and order-processing components 
exhibit U-shape patterns independently, which necessarily implies a U-shape pattern in the implied spread.  
This is in striking contrast to the finding by Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) for NYSE 
stocks that the adverse selection component declines and dealer costs increase over the trading day, 
resulting in an overall U-shape of the spread.  Second, small transactions on the TSE typically take place 
at the minimum trading unit.  These trades account for 40 percent of all transactions.  Large trades take 
place at 10 times the minimum trading unit and account for 14 percent of all transactions.  These large 
trades contain more information than medium or small trades on the TSE.  The adverse selection 
component increases with trade size and order processing cost decreases with trade size.  The evidence is 
consistent with the practice of handling large trades on the TSE.  Upstairs trading does not exist on the 
TSE.  In contrast, large trades are often prenegotiated through the upstairs markets, and this often leads to 
smaller adverse selection costs associated with large trades. Our findings of the striking U-shape pattern 
of the adverse selection component of the spread and the positive relation between trade size and 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for 204 TSE stocks used in this study.  The summary includes stock price, market value, variance of transaction price changes, 
average number of trades per day, average share volume per day, average yen volume per day, average trade size in number of shares, average trade size in yen, 
average spread in yen, and average spread in percentage terms.  Group 1 includes the stocks whose average prices are less than or equal to ¥2,000.  Group 2 is for the 
stocks whose average prices range between ¥2,001 and ¥3,000.  Group 3 is for the stocks whose average prices are between ¥3,001 and ¥30,000.  The sample period is 
three months from January 5 to March 30, 2000.  The market values in ¥ are as of March 31, 2000. 
 
 Group 1 
Price  ≤  ¥2,000 (N = 171) 
Group 2 
¥2,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥3,000 (N = 11) 
Group 3 
¥3,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥30,000 (N = 22) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Price (¥) 595 454 471 2500 221 2460 9473 6649 5861 
Market Value in ¥ (× 10 9 ) 626 944 285 2,369 551 1,951 3,981 1,013 2,596 
Variance of ∆Price 2.41 2.68 1.34 24.83 9.96 24.33 424.02 537.92 177.2 
Daily No. of Trades 296 176 249 473 275 361 540 570 333 
Daily Share Volume (×10 3 ) 1,760 1,793 1,190 1,860 1,436 1,165 1,114 1,238 740 
Daily Yen Volume (× 10 6 ) 1,073 1,507 550 4,686 3,720 2,920 8,505 10,721 4,876 
Trade Size in Shares (×10 3 ) 5.19 3.06 4.63 3.57 1.25 3.53 2.26 1.46 2.20 
Trade Size in ¥ (×10 6 ) 2.63 2.01 2.06 8.95 3.39 8.39 14.72 5.93 14.19 
Spread (¥) 2.22 1.16 1.85 7.76 2.08 7.77 29.07 20.6 21.05 











Table 2. Mean Estimates of Variances and Trading Activity Variables by 30-Minute Intraday Trading Intervals  
 
This table presents the cross-sectional mean estimates of the variance of transaction price changes, average number of trades, average yen volume, and average 
trade size in yen during 30-minute intraday trading intervals for 204 TSE stocks used in this study.  Panels A, B, and C provide the mean estimates for firms 
whose average prices are less than or equal to ¥2,000, between ¥2,001 and ¥3,000, and between ¥3,001 and ¥30,000 respectively.  
 
Panel A. Group 1:   Price  ≤  ¥2,000 (N = 171) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















Variance of ∆Price 4.49 2.32 2.16 2.20 2.10 1.85 1.90 1.92 3.00 
Daily No. of Trades 35 34 35 35 30 29 29 31 39 
Daily Yen Volume (× 10 6 ) 122 118 116 125 114 104 105 116 152 
Trade Size in ¥ (×10 6 ) 2.51 2.53 2.37 2.51 2.81 2.62 2.63 2.64 2.74 
Panel B.  Group 2:   ¥2,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥3,000 (N = 11) 
Variance of ∆Price 43.76 24.51 21.38 22.01 22.19 18.21 18.58 21.03 34.01 
Daily No. of Trades 59 58 60 55 44 43 44 49 62 
Daily Yen Volume (× 10 6 ) 584 566 581 530 470 419 437 488 610 
Trade Size in ¥ (×10 6 ) 8.52 8.55 8.38 8.53 9.54 8.95 9.01 8.91 9.02 
Panel C.  Group 3:   ¥3,000  <  Price   ≤  ¥30,000 (N = 22) 
Variance of ∆Price 794.79 491.07 422.35 398.31 361.84 305.17 273.10 300.11 559.70 
Daily No. of Trades 60 63 63 64 53 52 53 59 74 
Daily Yen Volume (× 10 6 ) 999 955 923 990 914 801 785 907 1231 











Table 3. Mean Yen and Percent Spreads by 30-Minute Intraday Trading Intervals  
 
This table presents the cross-sectional mean estimates of the spread in yen and percent terms during 30-minute intraday trading intervals for 204 TSE stocks 
used in this study.  The standard errors are in parentheses.  Panels A, B, and C provide the mean estimates for the firms whose average prices are less than or 
equal to ¥2,000, between ¥2,001 and ¥3,000, and between ¥3,001 and ¥30,000 respectively.  
 
Panel A. Group 1:   Price   ≤  ¥2,000 (N = 171) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















2.89 2.21 2.10 2.15 2.12 2.00 1.97 2.01 2.41 Spread in ¥ 
(0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
0.66 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.60 Spread in % 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel B.  Group 2:   ¥2,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥3,000 (N = 11) 
9.96 7.75 7.19 7.56 7.42 6.90 6.78 7.00 8.67 Spread in ¥ 
(1.12) (0.67) (0.45) (0.55) (0.59) (0.49) (0.40) (0.48) (0.83) 
0.40 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.35 Spread in % 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Panel C.  Group 3:   ¥3,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥30,000 (N = 22) 
40.26 30.45 27.86 27.52 27.60 25.22 24.69 24.98 32.05 Spread in ¥ 
(6.69) (4.94) (4.51) (4.02) (3.89) (3.51) (3.72) (3.51) (4.84) 
0.45 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.38 Spread in % 








Table 4. GMM Estimates of Spread Components, Autocorrelation of  
Trade Directions, and Implied Spreads 
 
This table presents the GMM model estimates of the parameters and the spread implied by the 
parameters for 204 TSE stocks used in this study.  The parameters of interest are the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread (α), the order processing cost component of the spread (β), and 
autocorrelation of trade directions (ρ).  The implied spread is defined as 2 (α + β). The proportion of the 
adverse selection in the implied spread is denoted as γ.  Panels A, B, and C provide the estimates for 
firms whose average prices are less than or equal to ¥2,000, between ¥2,001 and ¥3,000, and between 
¥3,001 and ¥30,000 respectively.  Panel D presents the statistical test results for the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference in the estimates between different price groups. 
 
Panel A.  Group 1:   Price   ≤  ¥2,000 (N = 171) 
 Mean Mean S.E. Std. Dev. Median 
α  (¥) 0.460 0.022 0.287 0.416 
β  (¥) 0.395 0.010 0.132 0.370 
α  (% of Price) 0.091 0.003 0.035 0.085 
β (% of Price) 0.141 0.013 0.172 0.072 
ρ 0.315 0.005 0.061 0.316 
γ 0.498 0.013 0.175 0.528 
Implied Spread (¥) 1.710 0.053 0.693 1.450 
Implied Spread (%) 0.464 0.028 0.368 0.330 
 
Panel B.  Group 2:   ¥2,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥3,000 (N = 11) 
α  (¥) 1.416 0.176 0.584 1.367 
β  (¥) 1.657 0.092 0.306 1.640 
α  (% of Price) 0.057 0.007 0.023 0.058 
β (% of Price) 0.067 0.004 0.015 0.066 
ρ 0.235 0.017 0.056 0.256 
γ 0.448 0.043 0.143 0.467 
Implied Spread (¥) 6.146 0.224 0.744 6.264 


















Table 4. GMM Estimates of Spread Components, Autocorrelation of 
Trade Directions, and Implied Spreads (Continued) 
 
Panel C.  Group 3:   ¥3,000  <  Price   ≤  ¥30,000 (N = 22) 
α  (¥) 6.268 0.944 4.427 5.195 
β  (¥) 4.001 0.371 1.738 3.177 
α  (% of Price) 0.071 0.006 0.026 0.074 
β (% of Price) 0.052 0.004 0.020 0.047 
ρ 0.284 0.013 0.060 0.292 
γ 0.571 0.029 0.138 0.587 
Implied Spread (¥) 20.539 2.415 11.329 15.805 
Implied Spread (%) 0.246 0.013 0.060 0.254 
 
Panel D. :  p-values from Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the Difference  
                 in Median Estimates 
 Between 
Groups 1 and 2 
between 
Groups 1 and 3 
between 
Groups 2 and 3 
α  (% of Price) 0.001 0.018 0.151 
β (% of Price) 0.505 0.001 0.025 
ρ 0.000 0.054 0.031 
γ 0.240 0.045 0.024 








Table 5. GMM Model Parameters and Implied Spreads by 30-Minute Intraday Intervals  
 
This table presents the cross-sectional mean and mean standard error (in parentheses) of the GMM model estimates of the parameters and the implied spread by 
30-minute intraday trading intervals for 204 TSE stocks used in this study.  The parameters of interest are the adverse selection cost component of the spread 
(α), order processing cost component of the spread (β), and autocorrelation of trade directions (ρ).  The implied spread is defined as 2 (α + β).  The proportion 
of the adverse selection in the implied spread is denoted as γ.  Panels A, B, and C provide the estimates for the firms whose average prices are less than or equal 
to ¥2,000, between ¥2,001 and ¥3,000, and between ¥3,001 and ¥30,000 respectively. 
 
Panel A. Group 1:   Price  ≤  ¥2,000 (N = 171) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















0.570 0.470 0.428 0.444 0.429 0.403 0.408 0.409 0.544 α (¥) 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) 
0.481 0.359 0.400 0.392 0.376 0.373 0.369 0.372 0.409 β  (¥) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
0.112 0.094 0.085 0.087 0.085 0.079 0.083 0.083 0.108 
α  (% of Price) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.151 0.132 0.142 0.141 0.138 0.140 0.138 0.138 0.142 β  (% of Price) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
0.338 0.303 0.303 0.310 0.363 0.314 0.310 0.303 0.304 ρ (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
0.508 0.530 0.478 0.490 0.494 0.478 0.487 0.486 0.528 γ (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
2.102 1.658 1.655 1.672 1.610 1.552 1.555 1.562 1.907 Implied Spread (¥) (0.080) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.061) 
0.526 0.451 0.455 0.456 0.446 0.438 0.441 0.441 0.501 Implied Spread  
(% of Price) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) 









Table 5. GMM Model Parameters and Implied Spreads by 30-Minute Intraday Intervals (Continued) 
 
Panel B.  Group 2:   ¥2,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥3,000 (N = 11) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















1.882 1.477 1.193 1.330 1.295 1.159 1.226 1.254 1.769 α (¥) 
(0.259) (0.190) (0.126) (0.174) (0.153) (0.143) (0.150) (0.176) (0.245) 
1.659 1.582 1.718 1.620 1.587 1.623 1.628 1.530 1.800 β  (¥) (0.156) (0.121) (0.094) (0.092) (0.086) (0.094) (0.101) (0.141) (0.058) 
0.075 0.059 0.048 0.053 0.052 0.047 0.049 0.050 0.071 
α  (% of Price) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
0.068 0.064 0.069 0.065 0.064 0.066 0.066 0.062 0.073 β  (% of Price) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
0.253 0.221 0.219 0.225 0.268 0.238 0.237 0.229 0.237 ρ (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021) 
0.515 0.471 0.404 0.438 0.439 0.409 0.421 0.443 0.473 γ (0.053) (0.048) (0.037) (0.045) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.057) (0.042) 
7.082 6.119 5.822 5.900 5.764 5.563 5.710 5.569 7.138 Implied Spread (¥) (0.387) (0.241) (0.186) (0.209) (0.181) (0.165) (0.212) (0.163) (0.384) 
0.285 0.246 0.235 0.238 0.233 0.225 0.231 0.225 0.287 Implied Spread (% of Price) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) 










Table 5. GMM Model Parameters and Implied Spreads by 30-Minute Intraday Intervals (Continued) 
 
Panel C.  Group 3:   ¥3,000  <  Price   ≤  ¥30,000 (N = 22) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















7.783 6.592 5.910 6.364 5.994 5.539 5.178 5.631 7.052 α (¥) 
(1.111) (1.012) (0.945) (1.027) (0.847) (0.861) (0.845) (0.893) (0.996) 
5.013 4.050 3.972 3.674 3.634 3.585 3.596 3.465 4.655 β  (¥) (0.669) (0.501) (0.409) (0.368) (0.375) (0.313) (0.258) (0.310) (0.395) 
0.089 0.074 0.066 0.072 0.069 0.062 0.058 0.063 0.081 
α  (% of Price) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
0.057 0.050 0.051 0.048 0.046 0.048 0.050 0.049 0.061 β  (% of Price) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
0.293 0.278 0.275 0.283 0.319 0.292 0.282 0.282 0.272 ρ (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
0.594 0.590 0.557 0.589 0.589 0.562 0.537 0.566 0.565 γ (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.038) (0.026) 
25.593 21.283 19.763 20.077 19.255 18.248 17.547 18.191 23.414 Implied Spread (¥) (3.268) (2.753) (2.534) (2.517) (2.124) (2.113) (1.943) (1.948) (2.632) 
0.292 0.248 0.234 0.241 0.232 0.220 0.216 0.224 0.284 Implied Spread (% of Price) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 







Table 6. GMM Model Parameters and Implied Spreads for Stock Groups based on Trading Volume  
 
This table presents the cross-sectional means and mean standard errors (in parentheses) of the GMM model estimates of the parameters and the 
implied spread by 30-minute intraday trading intervals as well as for the entire day for the 204 TSE stocks used in this study. The parameters of 
interest are the adverse selection cost component of the spread (α) and order processing cost component of the spread (β), both in percentages of 
stock price. The implied spread is defined as 2 (α + β) divided by the stock price. The proportion of the adverse selection in the implied spread is 
denoted as γ.  
 
Panel A. Mean Daily Share Volume<810,000 (N: 68) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















0.135 0.112 0.103 0.108 0.102 0.096 0.098 0.101 0.124 0.109 α   
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
0.131 0.112 0.124 0.123 0.120 0.121 0.121 0.118 0.126 0.123 β   
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
0.532 0.448 0.455 0.462 0.443 0.435 0.438 0.437 0.500 0.464 Implied 
spread (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
0.581 0.601 0.555 0.561 0.560 0.551 0.561 0.574 0.595 0.570 γ 







Table 6. GMM Model Parameters and Implied Spreads for Stock Groups based on Trading Volume (Continued)  
 
Panel B. 820,000 ≤ Mean Daily Share Volume < 1,511,000 (N: 68) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















0.110 0.093 0.082 0.084 0.085 0.077 0.082 0.082 0.109 0.090 α   
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
0.137 0.117 0.128 0.126 0.123 0.126 0.123 0.124 0.130 0.126 β   
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
0.494 0.419 0.421 0.420 0.416 0.405 0.409 0.412 0.478 0.433 Implied 
spread (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
0.522 0.543 0.481 0.498 0.506 0.478 0.489 0.489 0.535 0.505 γ 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Panel C. Mean Daily Share Volume ≥ 1,511,000 (N: 68) 
Trading Interval 9:00 − 
9:30 
















0.079 0.065 0.057 0.059 0.058 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.076 0.063 α   
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
0.140 0.128 0.133 0.131 0.128 0.130 0.130 0.131 0.134 0.132 β   
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.438 0.387 0.380 0.382 0.374 0.368 0.369 0.37 0.421 0.389 Implied 
spread (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
0.451 0.455 0.411 0.436 0.438 0.422 0.415 0.413 0.458 0.434 γ 













Table 7. GMM Model Parameters and Implied Spreads During the Last 30-Minute Period of Trading Day  
 
This table presents the cross-sectional means and mean standard errors (in parentheses) of the GMM model estimates of the parameters and the 
implied spread by 5-minute trading intervals during the last half hour period of trading day for the 204 TSE stocks used in this study. The 
parameters of interest are the adverse selection cost component of the spread (α) and order processing cost component of the spread (β), both in 
percentages of stock price. The implied spread is defined as 2 (α + β) divided by the stock price. The proportion of the adverse selection in the 
implied spread is denoted as γ.  
 
Panel A. Group 1:   Price  ≤  ¥2,000 (N = 171) 
Trading Interval 14:31 − 14:35 14:36 − 14:40 14:41 − 14:45 14:46 − 14:50 14:51 − 14:55 14:56 − 15:00 
0.102 0.095 0.093 0.101 0.107 0.165 α   
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
0.125 0.133 0.136 0.136 0.148 0.148 β   
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
0.454 0.456 0.457 0.474 0.511 0.627 Implied spread 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) 
0.557 0.523 0.515 0.534 0.526 0.591 γ 






Table 7. GMM Model Parameters and Implied Spreads During the Last 30-Minute Period of Trading Day (Continued) 
 
Panel B.  Group 2:   ¥2,000  <  Price  ≤  ¥3,000 (N = 11) 
Trading Interval 14:31 − 14:35 14:36 − 14:40 14:41 − 14:45 14:46 − 14:50 14:51 − 14:55 14:56 − 15:00 
0.053 0.052 0.052 0.073 0.079 0.119 α   
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
0.074 0.071 0.070 0.063 0.069 0.087 β   
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
0.254 0.246 0.244 0.272 0.296 0.412 Implied spread 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.032) 
0.398 0.407 0.411 0.511 0.510 0.549 γ 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.042) (0.055) (0.049) (0.052) 
Panel C.  Group 3:   ¥3,000  <  Price   ≤  ¥30,000 (N = 22) 
Trading Interval 14:31 − 14:35 14:36 − 14:40 14:41 − 14:45 14:46 − 14:50 14:51 − 14:55 14:56 − 15:00 
0.061 0.067 0.067 0.074 0.093 0.121 α   
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
0.058 0.051 0.059 0.062 0.063 0.070 β   
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
0.237 0.235 0.252 0.273 0.312 0.383 Implied spread 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.022) 
0.512 0.567 0.528 0.542 0.590 0.628 γ 










Table 8. GMM Estimates of Spread Components by Trade Size 
 
This table presents the GMM model estimates of the parameters and standard errors (in parentheses) of the 
adverse selection cost component of the spread (α) and the order processing cost component of the spread (β) 
sorted by trade size categories for 204 TSE stocks used in this study.  Also reported are the F-test results on 
the equality of the estimates across each row and column.  t-1 and t-2 represent the time of the trades with 
respect to the current quote at t.  * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A.  Adverse Selection Cost (α) by Trade Size 
t-1   
t-2 Small Medium Large F-value 
0.059 0.090 0.127 Small (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 84.23** 
0.068 0.092 0.125 Medium (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 65.59** 
0.078 0.106 0.127 Large (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 34.86** 
F-value 14.40** 7.05** 0.04  
 
Panel B.  Order Processing Cost (β) by Trade Size 
t-1   
t-2 Small Medium Large F-value 
0.158 0.124 0.091 Small (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 8.30** 
0.147 0.122 0.093 Medium (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 5.13** 
0.133 0.104 0.105 Large (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 2.14 








Table 9 Estimated Spread Components by De Jong, Nijman, Roell Model and Glosten and Harris Model 
 
This tables compares the De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) model, the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, and the Madhavan, Richardson, and 
Roomans (1997) or MRR model of spread components.  All three models are estimated for 204 TSE stocks used in this study.  The sample period 
is from January 5 to March 30, 2000.   
 
Panel A: Mean parameter estimates from alternative models 
 De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) model  Glosten and Harris (1988) model 
 R0-c0 R1-c1 c0 c1  z0 z1 c0 c1 
Group 1 
(N=171) 
      0.290 
     (0.014) 
     0.006 
    (0.001) 
     0.540 
    (0.015) 
    -0.001 
    (0.001) 
       0.257 
     (0.013) 
     0.012 
    (0.001) 
     0.573 
    (0.015) 
    -0.006 
    (0.001) 
Group 2 
(N=11) 
      0.967 
     (0.108) 
     0.043 
    (0.009) 
     1.921 
    (0.057) 
     0.011 
    (0.004) 
       0.745 
     (0.078) 
     0.086 
    (0.019) 
     2.142 
    (0.044) 
    -0.032 
    (0.008) 
Group 3 
(N=22) 
      4.232 
     (0.627) 
     0.180 
    (0.054) 
     5.519 
    (0.584) 
     0.075 
    (0.029) 
       3.549 
     (0.532) 
     0.361 
    (0.108) 
     6.202 
    (0.643) 
    -0.105 
    (0.028) 
 
Panel B: Adverse selection component, order-processing component, and proportion of adverse selection 
 De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) model  Glosten and Harris (1988) model  MRR model 
        q = 1   q = median        q = 10 q=99% MTU         q = 1   q = median        q = 10 q=99% MTU   




       0.295 
       0.540 
       0.328 
       0.301 
       0.541 
       0.332 
       0.349 
       0.537 
       0.366 
       0.472 
       0.553 
       0.443 
        0.269 
       0.567 
       0.295 
       0.280 
       0.562 
       0.306 
       0.375 
       0.510 
       0.394 
       0.622 
       0.403 
       0.596 
         0.460 
        0.395 
        0.498 




       1.010 
       1.932 
       0.335 
       1.043 
       1.941 
       0.341 
       1.397 
       2.032 
       0.389 
       1.943 
       2.146 
       0.465 
        0.832 
       2.110 
       0.276 
       0.899 
       2.086 
       0.294 
       1.607 
       1.823 
       0.444 
       2.699 
       1.390 
       0.650 
         1.416 
        1.657 
        0.448 




       4.412 
       5.594 
       0.417 
       4.469 
       5.608 
       0.421 
       6.035 
       6.268 
       0.458 
       6.333 
       6.217 
       0.494 
        3.909 
       6.097 
       0.361 
       4.022 
       6.055 
       0.374 
       7.155 
       5.148 
       0.527 
       7.751 
       4.799 
       0.624 
         6.268 
        4.001 







Table 10 Half Spread Estimates by Hasbrouk’s VAR Model 
 
This tables presents the estimation results of the Hasbrouck vector autoregression (VAR) model (1988, 1991a, b). Panel A reports the 
mean parameter estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses) of the VAR coefficients of the model. Panel B compares the 
estimated half-spread from the Glosten and Harris (1988) and De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) models, the Hasbrouck vector 
autoregression (VAR) model (1988, 1991a, b), and the MRR model. All models are estimated for 204 TSE stocks used in this study.  The 
sample period is from January 5 to March 30, 2000.   
 
Panel A: Mean parameter estimates of VAR coefficients on Qt and qtQt 
                      a01 a02 
Group 1 
(N=171) 
                  0.821 





                  2.831 





                  9.691 




Panel B: Bid-ask half-spread and trade size 
 De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1997) and  
Glosten and Harris (1988) model 
  
Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a, b) VAR model 
  
MRR model
     q = 1 q = median      q = 10  q=99% MTU      q = 1 q = median      q = 10  q=99% MTU   
Group 1 (N=171) 
Mean  
Mean s.e. 
    0.835 
   (0.027) 
    0.842 
   (0.027) 
    0.885 
   (0.027) 
    1.026 
   (0.027) 
     0.827 
   (0.026) 
    0.833 
   (0.026) 
    0.880 
   (0.027) 
    1.021 
   (0.029) 
      0.855 
    (0.026) 
Group 2 (N=11) 
Mean  
Mean s.e. 
    2.942 
   (0.100) 
    2.984 
   (0.106) 
    3.430 
   (0.196) 
    4.089 
   (0.222) 
     2.886 
   (0.103) 
    2.931 
   (0.109) 
    3.381 
   (0.196) 
    4.063 
   (0.228) 
      3.073 
    (0.112) 
Group 3 (N=22) 
Mean  
Mean s.e. 
  10.006 
   (1.204) 
  10.077 
   (1.197) 
  12.303 
   (1.750) 
  12.550 
   (1.360) 
     9.899 
   (1.192) 
    9.971 
   (1.185) 
  11.774 
   (1.498) 
  12.216 
   (1.255) 
    10.269 
    (1.208) 
 
 
 
 
